Privileged communication for accountants by Anonymous
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Haskins and Sells Publications Deloitte Collection
1928
Privileged communication for accountants
Anonymous
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_hs
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Haskins and Sells
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haskins & Sells Bulletin, Vol. 11, no. 04 (1928 April), p. 30-31
30 HASKINS & SELLS April 
TH E courts and state legislatures have for many years deemed it wise to 
exempt certain types of communications 
from examination during trial. The 
statutes of practically every state ex-
pressly specify what types of communica-
tions are exempt, although in certain cases 
the courts have extended the right of 
privileged communication to persons other 
than those specified in the state statutes. 
It is generally recognized by state statutes 
that communications between doctor and 
patient, lawyer and client, and priest and 
penitent are privileged communications 
and consequently are exempt from court 
testimony. The statutes of the States of 
Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee, as well as the 
territories of Alaska and the Philippine 
Islands, provide that communications be-
tween an accountant and his client are also 
privileged communications. However, 
few, if any, other states have provided 
in their statutes for privileged communi-
cation between the accountant and his 
client. 
The work of the accountant is highly 
confidential in nature. He usually has 
access to the client's most private records. 
The client must be able to place the utmost 
confidence in the auditor because the 
auditor acquires a knowledge of his client's 
business which that client very often 
would not want his competitors to have. 
Accountants have continually tried to 
maintain the confidence of their clients by 
refusing to disclose, even in court, facts 
concerning the client's business, without 
the client's consent. Usually the courts 
have upheld the accountant's conduct in 
this respect, although in a few cases the 
accountant who refused to testify concern-
ing his client's business was found guilty of 
contempt of court and penalized accord-
ingly. The very nature of the accountant's 
work, which has confidence as its founda-
tion, requires that the accountant be pro-
tected in maintaining the confidence of 
business men. 
The accountant is perhaps even more in 
need of protection in another phase of com-
munication between his client and himself. 
When an accountant is engaged to make an 
audit or an investigation, it is his duty 
to notify the client, either in the report or 
in a conference, of any relevant facts which 
he uncovers during the course of the audit 
or investigation. If the accountant dis-
covers irregularities or fraud, as he does in 
numerous cases today, it is his duty to state 
the facts. Yet, as soon as he does state 
the facts he places himself in danger. If 
the statement of the auditor casts sus-
picion, direct or indirect, on any certain 
employe, that individual may decide to 
sue for libel and, unless the accountant is 
protected by law, he may be punished for 
merely doing his duty in reporting the 
facts as he found them. Even in cases 
where there seemed to be no doubt about 
his guilt, the employe has sued for libel, 
after the client has waived the right to 
prosecute him, or after he has been tried 
and acquitted because of some technicality. 
Many accountants have learned from 
experience to word their comments on 
irregularities and shortages in such a way, 
if possible, that no reflection is made on 
any particular employe. But, cases may 
arise in which it is practically impossible 
to avoid making a direct statement of the 
facts as they actually exist. Communica-
tions of this kind furnish the client with 
confidential information concerning the 
condition of his business discovered by the 
auditor in the performance of his duties, and 
certainly should be considered privileged, 
just as is the lawyer's advice to his client. 
An interesting case, Hearn v. Ostrander, 
has recently been decided by the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, which, while 
not involving accountants, might, in view 
of the situation, very well be applied to 
communications made by accountants to 
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their clients. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant, while engaged in the perform-
ance of his duties as superintendent of the 
Ford Motor Company, made false and 
defamatory statements, in the presence of 
others, to the effect that the plaintiff, while 
in the employ of the company, had stolen 
spark plugs and other property of the com-
pany. It appeared that the statements 
were made during the course of an in-
vestigation which the defendant was con-
ducting after being informed that the 
plaintiff on several occasions had ex-
changed spark plugs, of the kind used by 
the company, for gasoline. The defendant 
claimed that the statements made were 
privileged communications, made without 
malice. The court held, inasmuch as the 
words complained of by the plaintiff were 
spoken during the course of the investiga-
tion, and inasmuch as it was the duty of 
the defendant, as superintendent, to con-
duct the investigation, that "the occasion 
on which the words were spoken by the 
defendant was such that they constitute 
a privileged communication, for which no 
action lies unless the words were spoken 
with actual malice." 
This decision is strengthened by other 
decisions and definitions. In the decision 
in the New York case of Klinck v. Colby, 
Judge Folger declared that privileged com-
munication exists "when a communication 
is fairly made by a person in the discharge 
of some private or public duty, legal or 
moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, 
in matters where his interest is concerned." 
In the case of Richardson v. Cooke, et al, 
56 South 318, where the defendant, an 
insurance adjuster, wrote letters to certain 
insurance companies charging the plain-
tiff, also an insurance adjuster, with being 
incompetent, amateurish, etc., the higher 
court of Louisiana sustained the defendant 
on the ground that he communicated the 
statement to a party who had an interest 
in the subject matter. 
Also Newell on slander and libel in de-
fining privileged communication says: 
"The proper meaning of a privileged 
communication is only this: That the 
occasion on which the communication was 
made rebuts the inference of malice prima 
facie arising from a statement prejudicial 
to the character of the plaintiff, and puts 
upon him the burden of proving that there 
was malice. In short, that the defendant 
was actuated by motives of personal spite 
or ill will, independent of the occasion on 
which the communication was made." 
The accountant is a disinterested person 
called in to determine the condition of a 
business. The very fact that he is a dis-
interested party, in addition to the ac-
counting knowledge and skill he possesses, 
is what makes his investigations of value to 
the client and other interested parties. In 
most cases the accountant has not the 
slightest acquaintance with the client's em-
ployes, and hence there should be no reason 
for malice in the report of the accountant. 
The occasion of an audit is one where the 
accountant is expected to verify the trans-
actions and results of a business and report 
the conditions as found to the client. 
Surely, it is reasonable to expect that any 
irregularity which may exist will be re-
ported with fairness, and such being the 
case, except in individual cases where 
malice can be proved, any communication 
made by the accountant to his client con-
cerning the condition of the business should 
be regarded as privileged communication, 
not only by common law but by statutes 
as well. 
